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where his immediate grantor held a deed conveying only the surface
rights, be precluded from denying the title of the remote grantor of the
surface rights, to the mineral rights. It is not impossible that the im-
mediate grantor had title to both surface and mineral rights, acquiring
title to each from a different source.
The North Carolina court has indicated that the common source
rule is not strictly based upon an estoppel in this state, as it is said
to be in other jurisdictions. 20  In Rya v. Martin,2 1 Merrimon, J.,
speaking for the court, said: "The conclusion thus established between
the parties is not strictly and technically an estoppel, but it is in the
nature of and has the practical effect of an estoppel. This rule of law
is founded in justice and convenience. .. ." The dissenting opinion
makes much of this supposed distinction. It is submitted that if under
a given set of facts the courts of other states apply what they term an
estoppel and reach a certain result, and the North Carolina court with
the same set of facts goes through the identical process to reach the
same result but calls its rule one of justice and convenience, there is no
real distinction, certainly no distinction such as would call for a differ-
ent result in the principal case.
The court's decision seems correct, being merely an application of
the age-old North Carolina rule that in an action of ejectment, the plain-
tiff must win on the strength of his own title, and not on the defendant's
weakness. 22 The apparent hardship of the present decision may yet be
remedied provided that on the new trial which the court granted, P
changes his line of attack and establishes his title in another way. D
should not be allowed to plead res adjudicata,23 because the supreme
court did not finally pass upon the issue involved, but merely granted
a new trial because of an error of substantive law in the trial judge's
charge to the jury.
LAFAYETTE WILLIAMS.
Mortgages-Conditional Sales-Recordation-
Conflict of Laws.
Intervener's assignor sold an automobile in South Carolina under
a duly recorded conditional sale contract. The purchaser, having col-
lided with plaintiff in Virginia while en route to Baltimore, had judg-
ment rendered against him'by a Virginia court, and the sale of the
automobile was ordered in satisfaction thereof. Intervener then inter-
' Jennings v. Marston, 121 Va. 79, 92 S. E. 821 (1917), 7 A. L. 1_ 860 (1920),
291 N. C. 464, 469 (1884).
'Carson v. Jenkins, 206 N. C. 475, 174 S. E. 271 (1934); see Sinclair v.
Huntley, 131 N. C. 243, 245, 42 S. E. 605 (1902) ; Bettis v. Avery, 140 N. C. 184,
192, 52 S. E. 584, 586 (1905) ; Virginia-Carolina Power Co. v. Taylor, 194 N. C.
231, 233, 139 S. E. 381, 383 (1927).
12 BLACK, THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS (1891) §§650, 654, 683, 684.
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vened claiming by reason of the conditional sale contract a prior lien
on the proceeds from the sale of the automobile. The court held for
the intervener. The Virginia statute making recordation of foreign
chattel mortgages essential to their validity does not apply to contracts
of conditional sale, and, moreover, the car had never been "removed"
to Virginia within the meaning of the statute. Valid foreign condi-
tional sale contracts will be recognized even though they are not regis-
tered in Virginia.1
The effect that should be given a foreign chattel mortgage or con-
ditional sale contract as against third parties in a state to which the
property has been removed has been a subject of much discussion.2
The decision in the principal case is in accord with the rule that statutes
providing for recordation of chattel mortgages are not applicable to
conditional sale contracts.3 However, in the situation presented here,
most states have statutes applying to both or to neither, so that in this
respect, the practice in Virginia is not in accord with that in most
states. As the effect of chattel mortgages and conditional sales is sub-
stantially the same in this situation, it would seem advisable to include
both in the statute.
When the contract, whether a chattel mortgage or conditional sale,
is made in one state, but delivery of the property pursuant to the con-
tract is to take place in another state, the older rule held that the law
of the state where the contract was made would govern its validity, so
that recordation in that state alone would be sufficient to protect the
mortgagee or vendor.4 This rule is probably still the weight of au-
thority, but more recent cases show a marked tendency toward the view
that the law of the state to which the property is to be removed should
govern, thus making recordation in the state to which the property is
removed necessary for the protection of the security holder.5 Al-
though it is true that the law of the place where a contract is made
usually governs its validity,6 in this particular situation, as the situs of
the property will be in the state to which it is to be taken, and as sub-'
1 C. I. T. Corporation v. Guy, 195 S. E. 659 (Va. 1938).
' (1928) 28 COL. L. REV. 111; (1933) 41 HARv. L. Rav. 779; (1929) 13 MINx.
L. REv. 724; (1926) 74 U. oF PA. L. Rzv. 749.3 The Marina, 19 Fed. 760 (D. N. J. 1884); McComb v. Donald's Adm'r,
82 Va. 903, 5 S. E. 558 (1888).
' G. A. Gray Co. v. Taylor Bros. Iron-Works Co., Ltd., 66 Fed. 686 (C. C. A.
5th, 1894) ; Cleveland Machine Works v. Land, 67 N. H. 348, '31 Atl. 20 (1893);
Barrett v. Kelley, 66 Vt. 515, 29 Atl. 809 (1894).5 Hervey v. Rhode Island Locomotive Works, 93 U. S. 664, 23 L. ed. 1003
(1876); Smith's Transfer and Storage Co. v. Reliable Stores Corp., 58 F.
(2d) 511 (App. D. C. 1932). Accord: United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v.
Northwestern Engineering Co., 146 Miss. 476, 112 So. 580 (1927); Eli Bridge
Co. v. Lachman, 124 Ore. 592, 265 Pac. 435 (1928).
'Harrison v. Sterry, 5 Cranch 289, 3 L. ed. 104 (U. S. 1809) ; Green v. Van
Buskirk, 7 Wall. 139, 19 L. ed. 109 (U. S. 1868).
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sequent transactions in relation to it will probably take place in that
state, the application of the latter rule would be more convenient to all
parties concerned and would greatly simplify any future litigation with
regard to the chattel.
A more difficult problem presents itself when the contract does not
contemplate removal or expressly forbids it, and the property is, never-
theless, removed to another state. A few jurisdictions refuse to give
effect to foreign chattel mortgages and conditional sale contracts, not
locally recorded, under any circumstances.1 Experience has shown
that this position is not advisable, as demonstrated by a frequent prac-
tice of unscrupulous persons in the Southwest, who remove automobiles
which have been mortgaged or conditionally sold elsewhere, to Texas,
one of the states which supports this rule, and there sell them. Under
this rule, purchasers are not encouraged to be careful as to the titles of
their vendors, and the original vendor or mortgagee in the first state,
even though innocent of the fraud practiced by his vendee or mortgagor,
cannot recover the property, and is practically unable to protect him-
self. The courts of other states have recognized the weakness of this
rule, and in one case even refused to give effect to a title obtained by sale
in Texas where the property at the time of the sale was encumbered by
a mortgage, validly executed and recorded in another state.8
The great weight of authority supports the proposition that a chattel
mortgage or conditional sale contract, if enforceable in the state where
it was made, will be upheld in a state to which the property is removed,
if such removal is without the consent of the mortgagee or conditional
vendor, and if no positive law of the forum is thereby contravened.0
I Corbett v. Littlefield, 84 Mich. 30, 47 N. W. 581 (1890) (on the ground
that recordation in a foreign state is not constructive notice to citizens of Michi-
gan); Sherman State Bank v. Carr, 15 Pa. Super. 346 (1900); Chambers v.
Consolidated Garage Co., 231 Tex. 1072, 210 S. W. 565 (1919) (on the ground
that recognition of unrecorded incumbrances is contrary to policy and prejudices
Texas citizens); cf. Turnbull v. Cole, 70 Colo. 364, 201 Pac. 887 (1921) and
Universal Credit Co. v. Marks, 164 Md. 130, 163 Atl. 810 (1932). As Louisiana
does not permit chattel mortgages at all, it is impossible to record a foreign
mortgage there, and such mortgage will not be effective in that state. Delop v.
Windsor, 26 La. Ann. 185 (1874).8 Forgan v. Bainbridge, 34 Ariz. 408, 274 Pac. 155 (1928).9 Shapard v. Hynes, 104 Fed. 449 (C. C. A. 8th, 1900); Flora v. Julesburg
Motor Co., 69 Colo. 238, 193 Pac. 545 (1920); Hornthal v. Burwell, 109 N. C.
10, 13 S. E. 721 (1891); Rodecker v. Jannah, 125 Wash. 137, 215 Pac. 364(1923); 1 WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) §339; RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF
LAws (1934) §§266, 273. Logically, the converse situation, occurring when the
contract is unenf6rceable in the state where it was made, calls for a refusal to
uphold the contract in the second state, even though it may conform to the laws
of that state. Fry Bros. v. Theobold, 205 Ky. 146, 265 S. W. 498 (1924);
Davis v. Osgood, 69 N. H. 427, 44 Atl. 432 (1899); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1934) §§267, 274. Contra: Weinstein v. Freyer, 93 Ala. 257, 9 So. 285(1891); Public Parks Amusement Co. v. Embree-McLean Carriage Co., 64
Ark. 29, 40 S. W. 582 (1897). It has also been held that when requirements for
enforceability in the state where the contract was made are not met until after
NOTES AND COMMENTS
It will be noted that there are two restrictions on this rule: (1) the
removal must have been without the consent of the mortgagee or con-
ditional vendor, and (2) application of the rule must not contravene
a positive law of the forum:
As to the first of these, it has generally been held that consent of
the mortgagee or conditional vendor to removal of the property will
deprive the contract of recognition unless it conforms to the law of the
state to which the property is removed'0 on the theory that any loss
sustained by the mortgagee or vendor in such a case is due in part to
his own negligence." There is, however, a growing minority holding
that consent is immaterial and will not vary the rule that the contract
should be recognized. 12 The theory of this position is that the rights
of the mortgagee or conditional vendor arise from the contract itself
and not from any care in keeping track of the property. It is con-
ceded by advocates of this position that, in some circumstances, the
mortgagee or conditional vendor might act in such a way that he would
be estopped to enforce the contract against third parties in the state
to which the property is removed, but it is also said that consent to
removal will not work such an estoppel. 13 This latter view .has much
to commend it from the standpoint of logic, but a balancing of the
equities would seem to indicate that the loss should fall on the party
whose negligence is partly responsible for the situation rather than on an
innocent purchaser or creditor of the mortgagor or conditional vendee.
On the other band, it is at least arguable that, in view of the strictness
of title requirements in regard to automobiles, a greater duty should
rest upon third parties in a case where an automobile is involved than
in a case involving other chattels, for in most cases a rather cursory
examination into the title to an automobile would reveal defects sufficient
to put third parties on guard, if such defects existed. The situation
with regard to consent should not be confused with that where
immediate removal is provided or contemplated by the contract.
removal of the property to another state, the contract will not be given effect
in the other state. Cunningham v. Donelson, 110 W. Va. 331, 158 S. E. 705
(1931) ; Yund v. First Nat. Bank of Shawnee, 14 Wyo. 81, 82 Pac. 6 (1905).
"'Globe Grain Milling Co. v. Northwestern and Pacific Hypotheekbank, 69
F. (2d) 418 (C. C. A. 9th, 1934); Moore v. Keystone Driller Co., 30 Idaho
230, 163 Pac. 1114 (1917); Farmers' and Merchants' State Bank v. Suther-
lin, 93 Neb. 707, 141 N. W. 827 (1913); Goetschius v. Brightman, 245 N. Y.
186, 156 N. E. 660 (1927); Newsum v. Hoffman, 124 Tenn. 369, 137 S. W.
490 (1911); Jones v. North Pacific Fish and Oil Co., 42 Wash. 332, 84 Pac.
1122 (1906).
ISee Newsum v. Hoffman, 124 Tenn. 369, 373, 137 S. W. 490, 491 (1911).
"Davis v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 35 Ariz. 392, 278 Pac. 384 (1929);
Greenville Nat. Bank v. Evans-Snyder-Buel Co., 9 Okla. 353, 60 Pac. 249
(1900) ; see Shapard v. Hynes, 104 Fed. 449, 452 (C. C. A. 8th, 1900).
"' See Greenville Nat. Bank v. Evans-Snyder-Buel Co., 9 Okla. 353; 367, 60
Pac. 249, 253 (1900).
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The rule in the latter case refers only to situations in which de-
livery of the property pursuant to the contract is to take place in a
state other than that in which the contract was made, and although in
some instances the distinction might be difficult to draw, the courts
have indicated that the two situations are quite separate. 14
A positive law of the forum is held to be contravened when the
forum state has a statute expressly providing that foreign chhttel mort-
gages and conditional sale contracts on chattels removed to the forum
must be registered in accordance therewith to be valid as against third
parties. In such a state, if the time prescribed in the statute within
which the contract must be recorded has passed and the contract has
not been so recorded, it will no longer be upheld as against third
parties. 15 Such states, however, will recognize unrecorded foreign
chattel mortgages and conditional sale contracts until the statutory
period has elapsed.1 6 These statutes are designed for the protection of
citizens of the state17 against foreign liens, the existence of which might
be difficult to discover, and for this purpose they are quite effective,
but they tend to operate to the detriment of innocent parties outside
the state. However, they are not to be greatly condemned if the time
within which the contract must be recorded is sufficiently long to enable
the diligent security holder to protect himself. A number of states have
statutes prescribing penalties for the mortgagor or conditional vendee
if he removes the property from the state without the consent of the
mortgagee or conditional vendor.18 Although statutes such as these in
some measure act as a deterrent to unauthorized removal of the property,
a more satisfactory solution to the whole problem would be the adop-
tion of uniform legislation on the subject such as the Uniform Con-
ditional Sales Act and the Uniform Chattel Mortgage Act.19 These
"Johnson v. Sauerman, 243 Ky. 587, 49 S. W. (2d) 331 (1932); Eli Bridge
Co. v. Lachman, 124 Ore. 592, 265 Pac. 435 (1928).
'Pulaski Mule Co. v. Haley and Koonce, 187 Ala. 533, 65 So. 783 (1914);
Hubbard v. Andrews, 76 Ga. 177 (1886), with which compare Olmstead v.
Carolina Portland Cement Co., 30 Ga. App. 126, 117 S. E. 255 (1923), aff'd, 157
Ga. 669, 121 S. E. 687 (1924); Southern Finance Co. v. Zegar, 198 S. E. 875
(W. Va. 1938).
"Hubbard v. Andrews, 76 Ga. 177 (1886).
'ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) §6868; GA. CODE (1933) §§67-108, 67-1403;
N. Y. PERs. PaoP. LAW §76; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1936) §5197. Such stat-
utes usually state that they are for the benefit of purchasers and creditors. It
has sometimes been held that such a "creditor" must be a judgment creditor.
Great Western Stage Equipment Co. v. lies, 70 F. (2d) 197 (C. C. A. 10th,
1934) ; Goodrich Silvertown Stores v. A. & A. Credit System, 200 Minn. 265,
274 N. W. 172 (1937). At least one case holds that tort claimants are not in the
category of purchasers and creditors at all. Universal Credit Co. v. Knights,
145 Misc. 876, 261 N. Y. Supp. 252 (N. Y. City Cts. 1932).
'GA. CODE (1933) §67-9908; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §4288; TENN.
CODE ANN. (Williams, 1934) §7295; W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1937)
§§4019, 5973.
"Section 14 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act provides that the buyer
may remove the property without the consent of the seller, provided he gives
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acts lay down complete and relatively simple requirements for refiling of
the contract upon removal of the property, which give adequate protec-
tion to all parties concerned. This protection will be effective, how-
ever, only when the acts are adopted in substantially the same form20
by all the states.
Under statutes providing for refiling of the contract on removal of
the property, it frequently becomes necessary, as in the principal case,
to determine whether the property has been "removed" to the state so
as to bring it within the purview of the statute. It has usually been
held that to accomplish this removal, the property must gain a situs
in the state.2 1  The situs of property is usually the domicile of the
mortgagor or vendee as itated in the mortgage or conditional sale agree-
ment.22 To change the situs it has been held that the mortgagor or
vendee must form an intent to remove the property to another state,
and then actually take it to some place in such other state and habitually
keep it there.P2 In other words, the removal must be "permanent and
continuous"; therefore, the bringing of automobiles and trucks through
or into a state on business or pleasure trips does not constitute
"removal." 24
Even among majority opinions, some diversity is found as to the
basis for the rule giving effect to foreign chattel mortgages and condi-
tional sale contracts which have not been locally recorded. It is gen-
erally stated to be founded on comity,26 which in itself is a rather
ambiguous term. The generally accepted definition is that comity is
the seller notice thereof before the actual removal takes place, and if he fails
to give such notice, the seller may retake the goods as in the case of default in
payment of the purchase price. Section 14 provides that when removal of the
property takes place, the seller must refile the contract in the filing district to
which the property is taken within ten days after receiving notice of the filing
district to which the goods have been removed, or the reservation of titlei in him
will not be effective as against third parties. Section 37 of the Uniform Chattel
Mortgage Act provides that when the chattel is removed to another state or
filing district, the mortgagee's interest will be defeasible unless he has the
instrument filed there within ten days after receiving notice of the filing district to
which the goods are removed, and if the instrument is not filed within six months,
the mortgagee's interest will no longer be effective as against third parties, even
though he did not consent to removal and did not have notice of the destination
of the property.
"Some states purporting to adopt the Acts have made changes which apply
only to the particular state. For example, the Indiana statute entirely omits
§14 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act.
I W. H. Applewhite Co. v. Etheridge, 210 N. C. 433, 187 S. E. 588 (1936).
'Hare & Chase v. Tomkinson, 129 At. 396 (Sup. Ct. N. J. 1925).
'In re Bowman, 28 F. (2d) 620 (N. D. N. Y. 1928).
'Peterson v. Kaigler, 78 Ga. 464, 3 S. E. 655 (1887); C. I. T. Corp. v.
Coleman, 54 Ga. App. 576, 188 S. E. 585 (1936); Forgan v. Smedal, 203 Wis.
564, 234 N. W. 896 (1931).
' See Hervey v. Rhode Island Locomotive Works, 93 U. S. 664, 671, 23
L. ed. 1003, 1004 (1876); Shapard v. Hynes, 104 Fed. 449, 453 (C. C. A. 8th,
1900).
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the principle on which one state will give effect to the law of another,
not because it is obligated to do so, but because it is more courteous
and convenient. 26 As no state is bound to give effect to the law of
another, many states extend this courtesy only to states which grant
them similar privileges. This has been called the theory of reciprocity,
and, although it is frequently applied, 27 it has been condemned by courts
holding that comity is not a mere courtesy, but a legal right which
should not be denied for any reason so flimsy as that of reciprocity. 28
Another approach to the problem, advocated by scholars and gaining
ground with the courts, is that, in an accurate sense, the forum does
not apply any theory such as that of comity, but rather its own set of
rules applicable in cases involving a foreign element, or in other words,
its own law of. conflict of laws. 29
ELIZABETH SHEWMAAKE.
Taxation-Constitutional Law-Exemption
of Governmental Instrumentalities.
The Port of New York Authority is a municipal corporate instru-
mentality organized under a compact between the states of New York
and New Jersey for the purpose of improving the port of New York
and facilitating its use by the construction and operation of bridges,
tunnels, terminals and other facilities. In pursuance of its purpose it
has constructed the Outerbridge Crossing, the Bayonne, Goethals, and
George Washington bridges, the Holland and Lincoln tunnels, and the
Port Authority Commerce Building of New York City, and operates
an interstate bus line over one of the bridges. The Authority has been
financed by funds advanced by the two states, revenue from the sale
of its own bonds, and income from bridge and tunnel tolls and from
bus fares. This action was brought by the United States Commissioner
of Internal Revenue to collect federal income taxes assessed against a
construction engineer and two assistant general managers employed
by the Port Authority. Held, employees of the Authority are not
exempt from the federal income tax because no burden is imposed there-
-"See Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. William D. Mullen Co., 7 F. (2d) 470,
473 (D. Del. 1925); Herron v-. Passailaigue, 92 Fla. 818, 823, 110 So. 539,
542 (1926).
- Mosko v. Matthews, 87 Colo. 55, 284 Pac. 1021 (1930) ; Farmers' and Mer-
chants' State Bank v. Sutherlin, 93 Neb. 707, 141 N. W. 827 (1913); Hart v.
Oliver Farm Equipment Sales Co., 37 N. M. 267, 21 P. (2d) 96 (1933).
2 Fuller- v. Webster, 5 Boyce 539, 95 Atl. 335 (Super. Ct. Del. 1915), aff'd,
6 Boyce 297, 99 Atl. 1069 (Sup. Ct Del. 1916) ; Hughes v. Winkleman, 243 Mo.
81, 247 S. W. 994 (1912); RESTATEMENT, CoNFLIr OF LAWS (1934) §6,
comment a.WCook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33
YALE L. J. 457.
